Carl Schmitt: A Social Life Amid the Rise of Nazi Germany (1930-1934)
Written by Bastiaan Hoks
Bastiaan is currently following the Research Master’s Modern History and International Relations at the University of Groningen. He specializes in democratic collapse, totalitarianism, racism, great power politics and NATO. This paper was submitted in June 2024 as part of the course Kinship Politics.
Carl Schmitt: A Social Life Amid the Rise of Nazi Germany (1930-1934)
On January 31, Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) walked down the animal zoo in Berlin with Erich Marcks [1]. At that time, Marcks was the press secretary of the Minister of Defense of the Weimar Republic [2]. Carl Schmitt tells him on this day that he is pessimistic about Hitler’s appointment as the chancellor of Germany. Marcks, too, regrets this historic appointment.
Both men pledged in the zoo to do all they could to bring the Nationalist Socialist ‘adventure’ to an end as quickly as possible [3]. A few years later, Erich Marcks was a high-ranking Nazi officer who would be one of the main authors of Operation Barbarossa [4]. Like Marcks, Schmitt would soon after Hitler’s appointment start publicly endorsing the National Socialists by praising Hitler and the Nazis in the Westdeuttscher Beobachter and the Völkischer Beobachter as representatives of the ‘true spirit’ of the German people [5].
According to Ellen Kennedy, Schmitt realised within a few weeks that he had to accommodate to these new men in Berlin if he wished to continue his career as a prominent legal figure in Germany. On 1 May 1933, Schmitt would officially join the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). Some weeks later, the Westdeutscher Beobachter would help position Schmitt for a high-ranking position by naming him “the most renowned national constitutionalist in Germany”. In July 1933, Hermann Göring appointed Schmitt as Prussian State Councillor, a role some would describe as “the crown jurist of Nazi Germany” [6].
Schmitt's volatility in this historical moment has been a topic of extensive academic debate. Understanding this conversion in the historical moment is vital for comprehending the role of personal agency on the eve of democratic collapse. For Hermens, the conversion from Schmitt’s pessimistic beliefs about the Nazis to his belief about Hitler as the true chancellor of the Germans between January 1933 to May 1933 signified Schmitt’s nature as one of a person that “just has to be part of things whatever way possible”, despite having to give up previous beliefs to do so [7]. Bendersky argues that Schmitt’s eventual support of the Nazis was the result of his hopelessness vis-a-vis the Weimar Republic, but he truly believed it was not a good thing that the Nazis were unconstitutional [8]. Wolin, in contrast to Bendersky, argues that Schmitt was not likely to truly believe in constitutionalism and therefore he was never genuinely sceptical about Hitler’s rise to power [9].
I will argue in this paper that Carl Schmitt, despite maybe not truly believing in nationalist socialist ideology at first, did pave the way for their rule during his legal career already. Schmitt collected a herd of sheep, put them voluntarily in a cage with a wolf, but somehow expected the wolf not to attack the sheep. Despite criticising the Nazis for their radical stances, I do believe that they were not too far remote from a previously theorised ideal of rule by Schmitt. Therefore, it might be insightful to examine the personal drivers of Schmitt from 1930 to 1934 rather than exclusively examining three months in 1933 to understand how he helped break down the Weimar democracy during the time the Nazis took over power. I chose 1930 to 1934 as these years would mark Schmitt’s most important conversion of beliefs and because they are well-documented in his diary.
The current historiographical debate demonstrates that academics are divided on the question of what drove Schmitt to develop a philosophy that would legitimise Nazi rule. According to Ohana, Schmitt’s philosophy could have originated out of a broader socio-cultural nihilist movement prominent at that time that would develop an intellectual urge for totalitarianism [10]. Jan-Werner Müller argued Schmitt was driven by personal ambitions, opportunism in the historical moment and an inherent preference for authoritarianism [11].
Additionally, Bendersky argues that it is very likely that Schmitt was driven by a thirst for intellectual recognition and personal ambition [12]. Despite not agreeing as to why Schmitt changed his views, Wollin does agree with Müller, Hermens and Bendersky that Schmitt was driven by personal ambition [13].
Furthermore, Bendersky also argues that Schmitt was a depressed and fearful person throughout his life [14]. This becomes apparent from the personal diary he kept. On 24 May 1931, he described himself as: “dead tired; depressed, helpless, cowardly, pitiful, down” [15]. Moreover, inseparably linked with his depression, Schmitt struggled with his fears. He feared chaos both in his personal life and in society. Firstly, he often feared being fatally ill: “afraid of a testicular rupture, horrible” [16].
Secondly, in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s and 1930s, there was plenty to be fearful about for Schmitt. An example comes from the 13th of June 1931: “Afraid of this Berlin. Depressed, afraid of the Jew Martin Wolff” [17]. It seems plausible that these personal characteristics had a considerable influence on his legal theories and subsequent advocacy for a more authoritarian governing structure. However, next to Schmitt’s opportunistic, stressful and fearful nature as discussed in the historiographical debate, I argue that it is also worth examining what influence socialisation with others might have had on the development of Schmitt’s philosophy.
Before diving into this factor, I want to demonstrate a quote from Schmitt himself that affirmed that this factor must have been important:
“I am not in command of what penetrates into my consciousness … I therefore am unable … to distinguish what is in my power and what is not, and, on the basis of this distinction, master the one and accept the other” (Carl Schmitt, 1948) [18].
Schmitt here acknowledges the fact that it is hard for one to truly know for certain that one’s thoughts and beliefs are original or from someone else. Hence, I will investigate how socialisation, next to his fears and depression, might have changed Schmitt’s beliefs (consciously or unconsciously) during a time when the rise of Nazi Germany ended the short-lived democratic Weimar Republic. During this period (1930-194), Schmitt was frequently sociable with other high-ranking Weimar and Nazi elites. Therefore, I aim to address the following research question: how did Carl Schmitt's social interactions with people influence his ideological stance toward the liberal democratic governing structure of the Weimar Republic between 1930 and 1934? I will address this research question by first elaborating on the concept of sociability and some methodological concerns. Second, I will discuss Schmitt’s legal and philosophical stances. Lastly, I will discuss empirical findings from primary sources that map Carl Schmitt’s social life.
Sociability
According to Simmel, sociability is the unique social need of people to be in each other's presence simply for the act of being together itself [19]. However, Simmel’s stance that humans desire to be in each other's presence solely for the act in itself is much debated. Various scholars argue that there is always some self-interest behind sociability. According to Sapolsky, sociability constantly functions as an element to challenge, defend and renegotiate power relations and statuses between people [20]. Fiedler and Hütter argue that it is not per se about power relations, but rather about an individual's self-interest in society. Individuals are inclined to participate in sociability as it secures continuous access to socially shared information that might be important for the individual [21].
Fiske agrees that it serves self-interests, but rather from a cultural angle. He argues that sociability invokes a positive emotional boost of communal feeling in humans. Therefore, we seek to evoke this feeling by searching for it in cultural sociability [22]. Kruglanski and Ellenberg take a more emotional perspective on sociability. They argue that the existential desire for recognition and significance of humans is one of the main drivers of human sociability [23].
All these different insights on sociability can be useful in analysing Schmitt's different relations with other high-ranking elite people or people close to him. As mentioned, I will mostly analyse primary sources from Carl Schmitt that discuss his daily interactions and thoughts about them. Here, I will mostly consult his diary and additional letter exchanges he had with close friends and peers.
Before I analyse empirical findings of Schmitt's life and sociability, I will first discuss Schmitt’s works and philosophy as they direct me where to search in the diary and letters. Subsequently, I will discuss the important findings of my primary sources research. Then, I will speculate how socialisation has influenced his beliefs and thereby his works and philosophy. It is important to note that sometimes historians can only speculate whether and how instances of sociability might have influenced Schmitt’s beliefs because his diary and letters do not directly indicate whether he changed his beliefs about Y because person X persuaded him to think so. Therefore, historians are left with speculation. I will map the different forms of sociability he was involved in, the beliefs that were presented to him and whether such beliefs found their way into his thoughts (diary) or in his works.
The Reichspräsident and the Constitution
The Weimar Republic was a liberal democratic republic that existed in an exceedingly troubling time for Germany. It lived through several crises, including military defeat, the harsh conditions set by the Treaty of Versailles, anti-constitutional forces on both the left and the right, and economic crises in the 1920s [24].
Due to these tumultuous events, Marder argues that Schmitt’s philosophy and legal works are inseparably linked to the historical moment and would not have evolved otherwise [25]. Schmitt believed that these instances of disorder in the Weimar Republic could solely be solved by extraordinary executive power vested in the person of the Reichspräsident by Article 48 (2) of the Weimar constitution [26].
The function Schmitt theorised for the Reichspräsident is called a commissarial dictator by other scholars. Despite that the Reichspräsident was kept in check by ministers dependent on the trust of the Reichstag, Schmitt believed that it was extremely important for the Reichspräsident to be able to act on certain competencies as freely as possible from legislative authorities to protect the constitution against unconstitutional threats [27]. Here, the Reichspräsident would even be authorised by the constitution to temporarily break constitutional rights to restore a state of normalcy that re-empowers the constitution. Pivotal here is the fact that the Constitution defines when a state of emergency exists.
According to Meierhenrich and Simons, around the 1920s, Schmitt was dedicated to keeping these emergency powers of a dictator within constitutional limits [28]. Likewise, Breuer argues that Schmitt in his 1927 Constitutional Theory was aware of the dangers of vesting too much power in the Reichspräsident and therefore he praised the legislative power for keeping the powers of the Reichspräisident in check [29]. However, Schmitt disapproved of the liberal nature of the constitution. It was too centred around the liberal rights of individuals rather than around the rights of ‘the people’ and their common purpose [30]. It viewed the state as an arena where different interest groups would compete with each other, the state was not sovereign in that sense. Its liberal nature caused enmity within society and therefore actually caused disorder rather than preventing it. This resulted in the many crises in the Weimar Republic [31].
Many important elites would agree that the law had to function differently in the Weimar Republic. Hence, political initiatives were taken to reform the constitution. In 1932, Schmitt was asked to help reform the Constitution. He did, however, not agree with proposals by others. After stepping out of this reform group, Schmitt would continue to criticise the establishment's efforts to reform the constitution. Schmitt argued that the proposals all proposed new legalities that would eventually also fall prey to the interest-groups competition that had characterised the Weimar Republic [32].
Due to the increase of unrest and crises in the Weimar Republic and the failed attempts to reform the constitution, Schmitt came to see the expansion of the Reichspräsident’s powers as the only viable solution to the unrest in the Weimar Republic. Due to his fed-upness and fear of the Weimar Republic, Schmitt would work out new theories that reconsidered how should be governed and where the essential legitimacy of this governing structure should lay, with a main role for the Reichspräsident. In 1934 (already after Hitler took over power), Schmitt worked out his idea of concrete order-thinking that would theoretically legitimise in hindsight what he had believed before Hitler’s rise and why he had supported the rise of a sovereign dictator in the years before 1934. Schmitt argued that the rules and norms laid down in a constitution serve a larger preexisting order, not the other way around. The preexisting order here refers to a transcendental category that expresses the true and homogeneous will of the nation. The political system should thus give voice to this will of the people, and the constitution should exclusively be secondary in regulating this will. The Weimar Constitution did not represent the preexisting order, and therefore, it was not legitimate. Thus, the preexisting order has the legitimate right to get rid of this constitution, as Schmitt would come to believe [33].
The fact that Schmitt had believed these arguments before 1934 is proven by the fact that Schmitt had openly supported the rise of a sovereign dictator around 1932 who would act on behalf of the people to change the constitution to get to a situation of ‘real’ normalcy in line with the will and unity of the people. Pivotal here is the belief that the sovereign dictator would be able to perfectly act in line with the will of the people. Here, Schmitt explicitly believed that the Reichspräsident, acting as a sovereign dictator, should be the one to restore the state of normalcy by pushing through constitutional reforms through the utilisation of his extralegal instruments [34].
The dictator would thus be able to determine when a state of ‘normalcy’ exists, as he is the sovereign who determines the exception, not the constitution, as this would keep the previous situation alive [35]. Apparently, in 1932, Schmitt did not think Hitler was the right person for this position. However, the change in Schmitt’s philosophy would undoubtedly pave the way for Hitler’s rise.
The Concept of the Political
One of Schmitt's most renowned works, which significantly influenced his shift towards authoritarianism as previously discussed, is his exploration of the ‘Concept of the Political’. The concept of the political is essentially a categorial ordering principle that structures ‘the political’ into a dichotomy of friend and enemy. This would exclude the option of a neutral agent that is not driven by either animosity or friendliness [36]. It would also bracket every political action into an essential distinction of friend and enemy [37]. Additionally, important universal principles such as rationality and morality are excluded from any essential role in ‘the political’ [38]. According to Sunstein, this distinction would essentially function as a heuristic rule of thumb for Schmitt to simplify the inquiry of estimating risks [39].
As mentioned in the introduction, Schmitt was a very fearful person. Next to personal fears, he was frequently fearful of society. Schmitt was mostly fearful of those forces that would undermine order. Chaos and ‘agents of chaos’ are diametrically opposed to order and the agents of order. Schmitt would typically associate the agents of order with the ‘self’, and therefore, agents of disorder were seen as ‘the other’.
This thick binary thinking of friend and enemy led Schmitt to conceptualise people, collectives of people, institutions and systems as enemies [40]. Here, one can see how this ‘concept of the political’ actually works in tandem with Schmitt’s rejection of liberal democracy and the rise of a sovereign dictator that would represent the ‘will of the people’. It makes democratic debate unnecessary as there is just the will of the German people. Therefore, for Schmitt, the ‘German people’ are the friend or in-group that prefers order (therefore their will should govern). The enemy are the people that support liberal democracy, communists, Jews or any group that does not have their interests in line with ‘the will of the German people’. The binary distinction would also legitimise extreme action to overthrow the enemy for the goal of establishing the order of the friend over the disorder of the enemy [41]. Over time, Schmitt came to believe that the use of force and all other necessary means could be justified by the state during this process [42]. Therefore, Schmitt’s ‘Concept of the Political’ philosophically underpin his beliefs about parliamentary democracy and the consequent need for a sovereign dictator that Schmitt would ultimately see as the only force able to restore order over disorder.
Now I will proceed to analyse empirical findings from primary sources from Carl Schmitt to map how he was influenced by other elites and friends/lovers while socialising in these pivotal years. In analysing, I will point out political beliefs as discussed in this political beliefs section and speculate whether they might have influenced Schmitt’s beliefs. My findings will be structured in three categorical sections that will each discuss the findings chronologically within that particular category. The sections are The Personal, The ‘Other’ and The Political.
Here, all three subsections will address the sub-questions of how social interactions under The Personal, The ‘Other’ and The Political have influenced Carl Schmitt’s philosophy and legal works.
Sociability: The Personal
Undoubtedly, one of the most important persons in Carl Schmitt’s life was his wife Duschka Schmitt. They spent plenty of time together as they lived together, went for walks, dinners and parties, and raised a child together. From their personal letter exchanges, it becomes apparent that Carl Schmitt was deeply in love with Duschka [43]. Therefore, one can best understand their relationship as being driven by a deep desire to be in each other's presence for nothing other than the act of being in each other’s company in itself. Furthermore, from Schmitt’s diaries, it becomes clear that they did talk about politics often, as Schmitt would often practise his talk/lectures in front of Duschka and as he often asked Duschka to check his papers before he would send them to a publisher. Schmitt would nevertheless not write down what Duschka would say, and if he changed his beliefs due to it. What does become clear is that Duschka seemed to be considerably antisemitic. Bendersky argues that Schmitt was befriended with several Jewish people and he generally thought they were okay people at first [44].
However, according to Gross, Schmitt's antisemitism was already “radical” before 1932 [45]. Despite the academic debate as to what extent Schmitt was antisemitic before 1932, there seems to be a consensus that Schmitt would grow more antisemitic over the years before 1932. Duschka could have played a role in this process. On Monday, 15 December 1930 Schmitt wrote: “Duschka reproached me for the many visits, especially the nasty Viennese Jews who were with us yesterday. Unfortunately, she is right” [46]. n 21 November 1931, Schmitt wrote the following: “Kirchheimer came at 7 and was depressed because he wasn't making any money. Had dinner with us (Dushka stupidly talks about the Jews)” [47]. Kirchheimer himself was Jewish and Duschka probably talked negatively about Jewish people, leading Schmitt to call it stupid to speak about Jewish people in front of Kirchheimer [48]. Additionally, on Monday, May 30 1932, Schmitt said: “Evening with Michael, Erich Mareks, Lieutenant Colonel Ott very nice (Duschka: Since he was in uniform, the air in this Jewish apartment has been purified)” [49]. Here Duschka also directly relates Jewishness to impurity. Duschka could have influenced Schmitt by feeding his antisemitism. This could have strengthened Schmitt’s friend/enemy categorization of German society as he came to believe that Jewish people did not belong to the German nation.
Additionally, one of Carl Schmitt’s dearest friends was Ernst Jünger. Jünger was a famous German poet and writer who wrote both fiction and critical essays on society. Despite his influence, Schmitt and Jünger's relationship can best be categorised as one of friendship and not one driven by the pursuit of personal interest. Moreover, Jünger does not seem to have influenced Schmitt considerably in their letter exchange or in real life as noted in Schmitt's diaries [50]. He did support Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political and was excited about the controversy it sparked in German politics. Thereafter, he expressed his hope that the book would enhance the capabilities of Schmitt participating in politics [51].
Sociability: ‘The Other’
Carl Schmitt socialised quite often with people that he would come to see as his ‘enemies’, such as Jewish people, Marxists and socialists. He would do so both for his work and also for his personal endeavours. He had quite an ambivalent relationship with them as he could call them intelligent and kind, but within the same sentence, he could personally attack them for being a ‘stereotypical’ Jew or Marxist. Especially between 1930 to 1932, it is important to see how interaction with these ‘others’ influenced his beliefs about the collective they are thought to represent.
On Saturday, 13 December 1930, Schmitt would meet up with Salin [52] and Erwin Beckerath [53], both prominent economists. Together, the three of them would go to the List Society to meet with other prominent Weimar elites. Schmitt would write the following about this evening: “Meeting nice people, the Reich Chancellor Luther, Saemisch, the clever Harms (his face sometimes reminds me of that of Professor Jordan, also a Jew), horrible thing, the consultation on the investigation of National Socialism. The social democrat Meusel speaks, but stupidly, hideously. The Jewish buffoons are the worst. Unfortunately, Beckerath was invited afterwards, expensive Burgundy at Mitscher. Discussed ridiculously, defended the National Socialists, about the political drama” [54].
Several elements are noteworthy here. First of all, this is definitely a socialisation event with other high-ranking elites where they informally discuss the current political situation in the Weimar Republic (sociability for renegotiating power relations and pursuing self-interests). He would speak to Jewish people and apparently despise them for being Jewish and he would despise the social democrat and Marxist Alfred Meusel for speaking about National Socialism [55]. It even seemed Schmitt would have defended the National Socialists here in light of the political drama, although he admits how stupid this was (Schmitt did not support the Nazis in 1930). Therefore, it could be speculated that as Schmitt was encircled with people he disagreed with and got irritated by, he might be pushed into a position that led him to defend national socialism as a way to distinguish himself from the others he feared.
Moreover, Schmitt would socialise with Fraenkel, Kirchheimer and Neumann. All three were former students of Schmitt, who came from Jewish families, and all intellectually associated themselves with socialist theory [56]. Schmitt would respect these three men mostly intellectually as they often engaged with Schmitt’s works and would give critical feedback on them [57]. Additionally, Schmitt also spent time with them privately, mostly with Kirchheimer. They would, for example, go to the zoo together for long walks [58] or drink wine together at someone’s home. Schmitt would even say about Kirchheimer: “I like him” [60]. However, their relationship is best characterised as being driven by personal interests and a strong desire for intellectual exchange. In terms of socialist intellectual content, Schmitt despised their socialist theories and consequently, he despised the men for being socialists.
On the fourth of August 1931, Schmitt writes the following: “Then went to the metal workers' union hall, which Neumann and Fraenkel showed me, with everyone at Kroll in the garden, had a modest dinner, Saar- and drank Mosel wine, followed by Palatinate. Stayed seated too long, until 1 am. Chatted about Brüning, his nationalism, the referendum of August 9, 779, etc. Scary Jews and socialists” [61]. Neumann was a professor often identifying with Marxism [62]. Here, one can see that Schmitt socialised with these ‘others’. Additionally, it is insightful to see that after socialisation, Schmitt would call these people “Scary Jews and socialists”.
Around 1932, the critique of Schmitt from these three men would heavily increase as Schmitt would increasingly support a dictator role for the Reichspräsident [63]. Schmitt himself would also distance himself from them. He would call Kirchheimer a “horrible that Jew” after meeting up with him [64]. Moreover, his distancing (intellectually) from Jewish people also becomes apparent from his letter exchange with Feuchtwanger, to whom he would write in November 1933: “I have a large collection of letters, which I have received from Jews in the last six months. Most of them are of an inferior quality and without any insight” [65].
Schmitt found living examples in his interactions with Jewish people, Marxists, and socialists of his belief in ‘the political’ as essentially defined by a dichotomy of friend and enemy. These encounters only served to strengthen his convictions. If Schmitt disagreed with or was jealous of the ‘others’ after the interaction, he would directly resort to personally attacking these people of their group identity as a source of their wrongness and their fundamental disconnection from the true will of the German people. Thereby categorising these people in the fundamental dichotomy of friend and enemy. Over the years, he would become increasingly more fearful and hateful of the ‘others’, and he would increasingly scapegoat them for actively creating disorder within the Weimar Republic, as can be seen in his diary from 1933-1934.
This hate for the ‘other’ is partly what made Schmitt believe that the Weimar order should be overthrown for a new order that represents the true will of the German people. Here, one can see how Schmitt's idea of concrete-order thinking (true will of the people) was built on his friend/enemy distinction. One can see that the Nazis had put Schmitt’s wish into practice as he would praise how the Nazis were “purifying the public life from non-Aryan racially foreign elements” in the Westdeutscher Beobachter [66].
Sociability: The Political.
One of the most frequently mentioned names in Schmitt’s diaries is that of Johannes Popitz. Popitz was one of Schmitt’s closest friends and they would meet daily. They drank plenty of wine together and often went to social events together. Popitz was the minister of finance of Prussia [67]. He was an important adviser to the government and via him, Schmitt would get in touch with the conservative Weimar intellectual and political elite surrounding von Hindenburg [68]. Thus, the many intellectuals or political figures that Schmitt met during this period were indirectly introduced to him by Popitz. Therefore, their social relation can be best characterised by both a desire to be in each other's presence for the act in itself and for Schmitt, there was eventually also definitely an incentive to pursue self-interests in this relation. However, Popitz did certainly not influence Schmitt to believe that a sovereign dictator was necessary. Popitz disagreed with Schmitt's position on a sovereign dictator and he also disagreed with Schmitt’s eventual endorsement of Hitler. Eventually, Popitz was even involved in a plot to conduct a coup against Hitler, something he had always kept secret from Schmitt [69].
Furthermore, on 1 November 1930, Schmitt met up with the Oberheids. Oberheid and his wife were NSDAP members. Schmitt would write down the following: “Oberheid called and came to dinner with his wife; drank nice wine with it. All Oberheids were introduced to Ernst Jünger. Always this stupid addiction to making acquaintances; Oberheid defends Hitler”. Although Schmitt would not agree with them at this point, it is noteworthy that he frequently socialised with Nazis during this time and they spent time in each other's presence, drinking wine and just talking informally. This sociability seems to serve either self-interests for Schmitt to inform himself on societal knowledge or the renegotiation of power dynamics and statuses between people.
Other important social interactions were at the Deutschen Gesellschaft club, of which Schmitt and Popitz were members. It was a society of high-ranking German civil servants and professors who would give talks, debate and especially drink a lot of alcohol [70]. They would, for example, talk about important things together, such as Article 48, which discusses the emergency powers of the Reichspräsident [71]. Again, Schmitt attended this social club for the pursuit of self-interest in acquiring societal knowledge and presenting himself vis-a-vis other persons with high status.
Overall, Schmitt had written down very little about interesting views or arguments presented to him at the Gesellschaft. However, it could be speculated that he was influenced by the club despite not noting it down in his diary. At times, Schmitt’s description of his mood after meeting up with the Gesellschaft could be speculated to say something insightful about the topics they discussed while socialising. On 24 February 1931, Schmitt would, for example, say the following: “At 2 in the afternoon we went to the Deutsche Gesellschaft in the car, with Popitz and a few others, until 4 o'clock, had a very nice chat, but I felt very depressed. Walked through the streets, the bookstores, sad to the business college, afraid of the Jews and their hatred”. Here, one could speculate that something at the Deutschen Gesellschaft triggered Schmitt’s fear of Jewish people [72].
Moreover, on 10 March 1931, Schmitt wrote: “At 1/2 5 Erwin Jacobi came, we had a lovely chat about the concept of elections, etc. He's a nice guy, sympathises with the National Socialists. Anger at today's party business”. A few things are notable here. Erwin Jacobi was a public law professor with a Jewish father [73]. Carl Schmitt informally socialises with him and he likes him and being in each other's presence (sociability for the act itself and probably a certain degree of self-interest). Additionally, Schmitt and Jacobi openly discussed politics with sympathisers of the National Socialists. They also probably discussed the current liberal parliamentary system, about which Schmitt thought it was worth mentioning his anger with this system after he had socialised with Jacobi. Jacobi might have put forth arguments for the National Socialists that would solve these problems caused by parliamentary democracy. Unfortunately, I am left with speculation here.
In 1931, Schmitt was generally not supporting Hitler at this point, despite his growing belief in a dictator at this point. He is deeply anxious about society. On Wednesday, 19 August 1931, Schmitt wrote the following about his day: “Played cards in the evening with Adolf Siepmann drank beer, with Jup, the crazy man will pass by, depressed; Communism will win and I will keep Europe at bay”. The crazy man here refers to Adolf Hitler [74]. Jup is a nickname for Carl’s brother, Joseph Schmitt [75]. Schmitt is not enthusiastic about Hitler. Moreover, what is very important here is Schmitt’s anxiety about communism in Europe. At the same time, he seems opportunistic and sees a possibility for himself and his theories to be the ‘safer’ of Europe by keeping it at bay.
Moreover, from 1930-1933, Schmitt’s letter exchanges with Ernst Forsthoff appear to have been a potential significant source of influence on Schmitt. Ernst Forsthoff was a legal jurist and professor with whom Schmitt interacted a lot [76]. Schmitt and Forsthoff would meet often and socialise in person; they would, for example, go to a cafe together [77]. Schmitt seemed to have socialised with Forsthoff for intellectual gain and access to societal knowledge. While first critiquing Schmitt for believing that the Reichspräsident should have fewer constitutional restraints, it becomes apparent from the letter exchange that Forsthoff changed his position on the topic, as he would call for the expansion of powers of the Reichspräsident within a few months. This seemed to have caused a switch in the dynamic between Forsthoff and Schmitt that went from challenging each other intellectually to ‘radicalising’ each other [78].
On 30 November 1931, Forsthoff sent something interesting to Schmitt. Forsthoff wanted to share a citation from Bismarck's notes with Schmitt, as he thought Schmitt would be interested in these notes. Forsthoff sends a long text, from which I think the following quote is the most important for Schmitt: “In my opinion, the revision or abolition of the Reich Constitution was constitutionally possible without violation of external laws, but even if this were unavoidable, I have never doubted that a minister would, in an emergency, rather advise a coup d'état and personally bear the consequences than to let his country fall into anarchy and the state to collapse with open eyes” [79]. This quote from Bismarck legitimises the rule of a dictator if chaos becomes unbearable in a society. Forsthoff would increasingly agree with Schmitt that the current constitution and the powers vested in the Reichpräsident did not meet the standard to restore order.
On 23 January 1932, he wrote a long essay to Schmitt arguing for a strong dictatorship. According to Forsthoff, no state should have a constitution that would cause its destruction. A state can not protect rights as laid down in the constitution if it is constantly challenged by illegitimate attacks. Therefore, a legal order should punish those who aim to undermine the legality of its order. A dictatorship is the only way to challenge these illegitimate attacks, according to Forsthoff [80]. Moreover, it does seem that Forsthoff argues that a constitution can and should be altered if it can not protect the rights it offers. A dictator would be the fitted person to do this. Schmitt does seem heavily influenced by Forsthoff’s arguments as he also came to believe that a dictator should not only have all rights and power to restore a state of normalcy, but he should also be able to determine when a state of emergency exits based on ‘the will of the people’, which implies that there is no constraining constitutional definition that defines the state of emergency. Once the state of normalcy was restored according to the dictator and the will of the people, a dictator should regrant certain liberties to ‘the people’ according to Schmitt. However, here, Schmitt and Forsthoff create a position with so much power while simultaneously naively believing that it won’t be misused or corrupted.
The fact that Schmitt had altered his beliefs on the position of the constitution became apparent in February 1932 in a radio address where he said that the current contribution of law to the preexisting order was not functioning as the constitution created intra-political enmity. Therefore, law had to relate differently to the preexisting order, it had to serve it and regulate it, but not create it [81]. This change in beliefs would also eventually result in a shift in Schmitt’s attitude towards the NSDAP and Hitler. On 27 February 1932, he wrote that in the 13 March elections, he was going to vote for Hitler for the first time [82].
One could see this vote from Schmitt more as discontent with the Weimar Republic and Von Hindenburg rather than a full-blown support for Hitler. However, it does break with one year before, when Schmitt saw Hitler as a direct danger. Now he might be more opportunistic in giving Hitler a chance and see where it goes. Later that year, when Von Hindenburg was going to retire, Schmitt wrote on 6 September 1932: “But I was dead tired. Finally, Popitz spoke to Michael about the successor to Hindenburg (rather Hitler than Brüning)” [83]. When Schmitt hears on 30 January 1933 that Hitler has become Chancellor, his first reaction is “Excited, happy, happy” [84]. His opportunism at this moment is best caught in his following passage about Hitler: “You don't know whether it (Hitler) is a pigeon or a snake”. He desperately wanted things to change, and he thus eventually considered giving Hitler a chance to do so.
On 4 April 1933, Schmit,t together with Papen, Popitz, Neumann, Wedemyer and Landfried drew a plan to make the Chancellor a ‘natural president’, which would extend the power of the chancellor. As the plan did not get through, Papen promised Schmitt to ask for a joint consultation with Hitler to discuss a new proposal. Thereby, Schmitt would effectively help Hitler strengthen his power and position. He was excited about this invitation [85]. Schmitt seems to accept Hitler as the much-needed person (and dictator) that Schmitt had been looking for the past decade. On 3 October 1933, Schmitt attended a speech from Hitler on the total state. He would describe his mood after the speech as “Very comforted” [86].
On Thursday 26 January 1933, Schmitt would write the following about meeting up with Dietrich Schäfer: “Sadly home at 8, accompanied by the SA man Dietrich Schäfer, who said very well that the current government can only defeat the communists through terror and they are not capable of that, only National Socialism” [87]. Schäfer was a member of the SA, a paramilitary wing of the NSDAP. Schäfer would also strengthen this idea Schmitt already had that only the Nazis would be able to restore order. The communists are framed as a danger to order, and the subsequent legitimisation of violence to silence the communists and restore order.
Conclusion
Carl Schmitt was a complex person who has been influenced by a lot of factors throughout his life in formulating his legal philosophy. His persistent depression and his fear of disorder have significantly influenced how he perceived society and interacted with it. These personality traits, combined with growing social unrest in the Weimar Republic, have likely caused Schmitt to believe in an urge for more autocratic governing structures. Additionally, as discussed in the academic debate, Schmitt also seemed like the type who would ‘go with the flow’ in trying to make an intellectual career. While recognising the importance of these factors and the interplay between different factors in general, I contend to offer an academic inquiry in this paper on the role of socialisation in Schmitt’s life and how it might have changed his beliefs. Hereby, I aimed to answer the question of how socialisation changed his beliefs about the liberal democratic governing structure of the Weimar Republic between 1930 and 1934. Although historians are left to speculate in conducting such an inquiry, I demonstrated in this paper that there is a correlation between the development of Schmitt’s philosophy on constitutional law and the social interactions he had during the time that the Weimar Republic collapsed. Such a conclusion is supported by various empirical arguments.
First, Schmitt acknowledges that he does not exactly know where his thoughts come from. Second, it is perceivable that Duschka fortified Schmitt’s antisemitism as she would often make antisemitic comments. Third, in combination with Duschka’s antisemitism reflecting on Schmitt, Carl Schmitt also frequently socialised with ‘others’ such as Jewish people and Marxists. He would often be irritated by these ‘others’, and even if he was not annoyed by them, he would still personally attack them and treat them according to their ‘stereotypical’ group ‘characteristics’. His animosity and prejudicial treatment of these 'others' grew markedly over the years, likely as a result of his interactions with them during a turbulent period in the Weimar Republic, where they were seen as hindering ‘real’ solutions. Fourth, Schmitt did seem least influenced by most intellectual peers that tried to convince Schmitt of Nazi ideology directly. However, Schmitt’s pessimism about the Weimar Republic would be affirmed to such an extent that socialisation with Nazis might have strengthened his views. Fifth, his intellectual socialisation with people like Forsthoff have influenced his beliefs regarding the constitutional limits of a ‘sovereign dictator’. Lastly, it is conceivable that his social interactions with Duschka, his friends, 'others,' and peers influenced his concept of the political as a struggle between friends and enemies, leading to his belief in establishing a 'sovereign dictator' who acts on the unified will of the German people against the perceived enemies.
Endnotes
Ellen Kennedy, Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 16.
Carl Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” in Carl Schmitt Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, edited by Gerd Giesler and Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 89.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 16.
David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 39-40.
Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons, ““A Fanatic of Order in an Epoch of Confusing Turmoil”: The Political, Legal, and Cultural Thought of Carl Schmitt,” in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 8.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 17-18.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 17-19.
Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).
Richard Wollin, The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).
David Ohana, “Carl Schmitt’s Legal Fascism,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 20, no. 3 (2019): 275.
Jan-Werner Müller, A Dangerous Mind: Carl Schmitt in Post-War European Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich.
Wollin, The Seduction of Unreason.
Joseph Bendersky, “Schmitt’s Diaries,” in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 130-137.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 111.
Carl Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” in Carl Schmitt Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, edited by Gerd Giesler and Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 67-68.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 116.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 15.
Joachim I. Krueger, David J. Grüning and Tanushri Sundar, “Power and Sociability,” in The Psychology of Sociability: Understanding Human Attachment, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, William Crano and Klaus Fiedler (New York: Routledge, 2022): 199.
Krueger, Grüning and Sundar, “Power and Sociability,” 199.
Mandy Hütter and Klaus Fiedler, “Sociability and Advice Taking,” in The Psychology of Sociability: Understanding Human Attachment, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, William Crano and Klaus Fiedler (New York: Routledge, 2022): 194-195.
Alan Page Fiske, “An Emotion Niche for the Cultural Evolution of Social Practices,” in The Psychology of Sociability: Understanding Human Attachment, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, William Crano and Klaus Fiedler (New York: Routledge, 2022), 57-75.
Arie W. Kruglanski and Molly Ellenberg, “How does the Quest fir Significance Shape Human Sociability?” in The Psychology of Sociability: Understanding Human Attachment, edited by Joseph P. Forgas, William Crano and Klaus Fiedler (New York: Routledge, 2022), 116.
Ulrich K. Preuß, “Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Constitution,” in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 471-473.
Michael Marder, Groundless Existence: The Political Ontology of Carl Schmitt (London: Bloomsbury Academic & Professional, 2012), 3.
Preuß, “Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Constitution,” 473-475.
Carl Schmitt, “The Guardian of the Constitution: Schmitt on Pluralism and the President as the Guardian of the Constitution,” in The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law, edited by Lars Vinx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 157.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 32.
Stefan Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext: Intellektuellenpolitik in der Weimarer Republik (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 112.
William Rasch, “Carl Schmitt’s Defense of Democracy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 331-334.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 123.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 136.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 34-36.
Preuß, Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Constitution, 483-484.
Preuß, Carl Schmitt and the Weimar Constitution, 475-476.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 20-21
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 23.
Ben Van de Wall, “Political Existentiality in Carl Schmitt; Reenchanting the Political,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 50, no. 6 (2023): 22.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 25.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 16-17.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 15-17.
Christopher Adair-Toteff, Carl Schmitt on Law and Liberalism (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 99.
Carl Schmitt and Duschka Schmitt, “Briefe, Briefentwürfe und -auszüge aus Tagebüchern,” in Briefwechsel 1923 Bis 1950, edited by Martin Tielke (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2020), 46-392.
Bendersky, “Schmitt’s Diaries,” 117-125.
Raphael Gross, “The “True Enemy”: Antisemitism in Carl Schmitt’s Life and Work,” in The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt, edited by Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 110-111.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 69.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 146.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 114.
Carl Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1932,” in Carl Schmitt Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, edited by Gerd Giesler and Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 194.
Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt: Briefe 1930-1983 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1999).
Schmitt and Jünger, Briefe 1930-1983, 3-20
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 68.
Familie von Beckerath, “Dr. phil. Emil Erwin von Beckerath,” Familien Webseite.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 68.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 68.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 14-16.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 16-19.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 53.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 62.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 97.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 129-130.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 12.
Breuer, Carl Schmitt im Kontext, 130.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1932,” 231.
Carl Schmitt and Ludwig Feuchtwanger, Briefwechsel 1918–1935 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2007), 396.
Ville Suuronen, “Nazism as Inhumanity: Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt on Race and Language,” New German Critique 49, no. 2 (August 2022): 21.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 4.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 12.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 14.
Kennedy, Constitutional Failure, 14.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 60.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 92.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 96.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1931,” 132.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 45.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 6.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1930,” 6.
Angela Reinthal, Reinhard Mußgnug and Dorothee Mußgnug, Briefwechsel Ernst Forsthoff - Carl Schmitt 1926-1974 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007), 33-40.
Reinthal, Mußgnug and Mußgnug, Briefwechsel Ernst Forsthoff, 37-38.
Reinthal, Mußgnug and Mußgnug, Briefwechsel Ernst Forsthoff, 39-40.
Meierhenrich and Simons, “A Fanatic of Order,” 25.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1932,” 181.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1932,” 214.
Carl Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1933,” in Carl Schmitt Tagebücher 1930 bis 1934, edited by Gerd Giesler and Wolfgang Schuller (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 257.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1933,” 278.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1933,” 305.
Schmitt, “Tagebuch 1933,” 256.
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