Anger-Paradox: How Mearsheimer made me Defend Offensive Realism
Written by Hannah Maaßen
Hannah is studying her Research Master’s in Modern History & International Relations at the University of Groningen. This essay was submitted as part of the Theory of Modern History and International Relations course. Hannah researches how wars, especially those entities already marginalised in wars, are portrayed by International Relations scholars.
Anger-Paradox: How Mearsheimer made me Defend Offensive Realism
For me, researching a topic is provoked by two feelings: passion and anger. The papers I wrote during my Bachelor’s degree were only satisfactory (and were only completed) when the starting point was one of those feelings. The aim of this essay is to begin with an article we find theoretically fascinating, and to explain this fascination. The article that probably fascinated me most in the last two years is by one of the founders of the theory of Offensive Realism, John Mearsheimer (2022). It is an article about “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War”, in which he states that not the invader Russia, but the West (especially the US and NATO) caused the war. He uses his theory of Offensive Realism to underpin this claim. My fascination for this article is informed by the emotion of anger.
The anger/fascination is mainly caused by my own understanding of the Russian War in Ukraine and its causes. It is ‘normative anger’: I have Ukrainian friends, and – in my opinion – stripping Russia from responsibility, and completely ignoring the struggle (and agency) of Ukrainians in favour of theory, is at least morally questionable. Most importantly, Mearsheimer’s argumentation is not an outsider in the world of i/International r/Relations (ir/IR) and the public discourse.
On a theoretical level, I find myself more situated within the Constructivist or Poststructuralist school of thought. But while I do not agree with the beliefs formulated in (Offensive) Realism, it is often used and adopted. This is another source of fascination: why is this (Offensive) Realism so often used to explain and understand international politics?
I believe that if I want to critique something, I must understand it, especially if I develop such a strong – more destructive than productive – feeling of anger.
Making the anger/fascination productive
While researching and writing this essay, I experienced a shift: originally, I wanted to use the ‘normative anger’ and fascination to better understand Realism-informed discourse in science and politics. As I read more about Offensive Realism, and then re-read Mearsheimer’s essays, I did not get the effect I anticipated. I now have a better understanding of Offensive Realism and its arguments. But I experienced a new form of anger in reading the essays: I found myself in the strange position of being angry at the very founder of Offensive Realism for not correctly applying his own theoretical framework.
This ‘Realist anger’ created the new thinking space to investigate Mearsheimer’s essay (and the causes of the Russian war in Ukraine) with the theory of Offensive Realism, to potentially defeat Mearsheimer with his own weapons. The shift can be traced along the structure of this essay.
The fascination is sometimes explicit in the formation of my anger, and sometimes it is implicit: if something fascinates me, I get absorbed and lost in the topic. The essay reflects the ways in which my fascination (and anger) constantly created new thinking spaces, new questions, and new fascinations. These all stem from the initial anger/fascination, leading me to make a first informal case study to broaden, deepen, and better understand my fascination/anger and make it productive.
The starting point was one article in which Mearsheimer specifically formulates his Realist assumptions to investigate the two great-power rivalries of “the US vs Russia in eastern Europe (over Ukraine) and the US vs China in East Asia (over Taiwan)” (Mearsheimer 2023). Those theoretical assumptions will be laid out, and are then utilised to analyse the essays dealing with the war in Ukraine in more theoretically-informed fashion.
Stepping back from anger: Understanding (Offensive) Realism
First, the raw theoretical assumptions of Mearsheimer (2023) [1] will be investigated. While the article is designed to investigate two specific cases, Mearsheimer makes the general statement that “Realism is the best theory for understanding world politics” (ibid.). He explains (Offensive) Realism as follows:
The central principle of international politics is the international system, which is anarchic (without supreme authority). States are the key. They behave, regardless of their political system, according to the same logic. The international system is highly uncertain; only capabilities can be observed. The intentions of states or leaders are hidden inside the minds of policy-makers, and cannot be observed. The future of a state’s behaviour cannot be anticipated. Following this logic, states fear each other. Security competition is deemed as an unalterable fact of the international system.
States are sovereign entities, which defend their prime interest: survival. Due to the lack of authority in the international system, states are vulnerable and behave after the principle of self-help. States seek for a balance of power in the international system, and compete for more power, whereby power is mainly understood in terms of military capabilities. This has the consequence that it becomes a logic of relative gains (only one can win), or a zero-sum game. Despite the core principle of competition, states can cooperate if it serves their interest (especially regarding the balancing of power). Balancing can happen through a state building up its own capabilities, or forming an alliance. In Realism, war is an acceptable instrument of statecraft to improve a state’s strategic position.
There are different power relations possible within the international system, all depending on the number of great powers. Great powers are states with offensive military capabilities, their politics is characterised by security competition. As states, they are looking for opportunities to gain power, and prevent the balance of power shifting against them. Their ideal is becoming a regional hegemon, dominating one area of the world without competition.
If great powers cooperate within an institution, the institution rules are written by the great powers to suit their interests. Great powers are only interested in regions, if they are in their strategic – economic or power – interest.
Why the West is at fault (in Mearsheimer’s view)
While I personally don’t value the simplicity and focus of Realism, the contents of the theory did not enrage me (as much). What troubles me more is Mearsheimer’s ‘interpretation’ of the Russian war against Ukraine, and his framing of it as scientific due to the use of the (Offensive) Realist lens.
Regarding the Russian War in Ukraine, Mearsheimer published two more articles “The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War” in 2022 and “Who Caused the Ukraine War?” in 2024. All contain similar arguments, just set in a different structure and context. While Mearsheimer only specifically mentions Realism in his 2023 article, I assume that his theory (which he himself stated to be the best explanation of world politics) is the grounding for his arguments. This argumentation is now shortly summarized.
Mearsheimer’s main argument is that not Russia but the US/NATO caused the war in Ukraine. He states: “the principal cause of the conflict is the NATO decision to bring Ukraine into the alliance, which virtually all Russian leaders see as an existential threat that must be eliminated.
NATO expansion, however, is part of a broader strategy that is designed to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border” (Mearsheimer 2024). In all three essays he argues against the “conventional wisdom”, that Putin is solely responsible for the war (e.g. Mearsheimer 2022: 14), and explicitly states on multiple occasions, that first, there “is no evidence in the public record that Putin was contemplating, much less intending to put an end to Ukraine as independent state and make it part of greater Russia” (ibid: 14f), second, that “[i]n fact, there is significant evidence that Putin recognized Ukraine as an independent country” (ibid: 15) and third, that if Putin was lying about his motives – which Mearsheimer doubts as he has “written a book about lying in [ip]” (ibid: 16) – he clearly adopted a military strategy that is not suited to conquer Ukraine (ibid.).
Instead, it is the West’s fault, as Russia (or Putin) felt so threatened by a (de-facto) NATO expansion to Ukraine, that it had no other choice than to invade Ukraine (ibid 2024). Russian leaders did always paint Ukrainian NATO-membership as a red-line issue, whose crossing would pose an existential threat to Russia (ibid.). Furthermore, Putin tried to resolve this issue diplomatically on multiple occasions, but was dismissed by the US/NATO (Mearsheimer 2022: 23).
Considering the descriptions of Offensive Realism above, I find that the arguments articulated to show that the West is at fault, in some cases, do not align with the assumption of (Offensive) Realism. Reading parts of his book (2001), to further understand the theory, this gut-feeling manifested, and from the initial aim of understanding his theory to understand his argument and the discourse, I came to the ‘Realist-anger’-informed question: whether Mearsheimer himself follows the logic of his own theory in his argumentation.
Productive Anger and Confusion: First-glance discrepancies of theory and practice
While still finding the contents of his argument morally (and factually) questionable, I now had the impression of Mearsheimer cherry-picking parts of his theory to underpin his argument, while ignoring aspects of his theory that would paint another picture.
Fuelled by this new Realist anger (and ‘normative anger’), I wanted to gain an oversight of Mearsheimer’s argumentation: I ordered the contents of the three essays in a chronological table (containing event mentioned, and what Russia or NATO/US did and how Mearsheimer interpreted it). Starting point to investigate the felt discrepancy of theory and practice, was to apply Mearsheimer’s theory to his depiction and interpretation of the causes of the war summarised in the table. [2]
The discrepancies are now formulated, and Mearsheimer’s arguments are compared to his theory as formulated before and his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). This list contains points that made me ‘realistically angry’ and not only ‘normatively angry’. Those are only the most obvious discrepancies within theory and practice.
First of all, Offensive Realism specifically states that the intentions of states or leaders cannot be observed by other states (Mearsheimer 2023, 2001: 31). But Mearsheimer (2022: 14-16) himself seems certain to know that it was never Putin’s intention to conquer Ukraine, and that Putin did certainly not lie about his intentions.
Furthermore, if Putin in fact felt threatened in its survival, I wonder – adopting myself the Offensive Realist lens – why Russia would (in a world of relative gains) fight a war in a non-NATO state which will lead to decrease in Russia’s potential and actual power (Mearsheimer 2001: 43), but will not harm NATO as much (as they are sending weapons and not troops (actual power) or lose population (potential power).
It could be interpreted as balancing (ibid: 139) in which “threatened states seriously commit themselves to containing their dangerous opponent. […] they are willing to [fight]”. A victorious aggressor can shift the balance of power in his favour, by conquering some portion of a state’s population, gaining strategically important territory (=buffer zones) (ibid: 150) or eliminating a state from the ranks of a great power (ibid: 151). Those goals can be achieved by destroying a rival, annexing, or disarming and neutralizing the state (ibid.). Mearsheimer only considers a neutralisation of Ukraine as a motive for Russia.
Further investigating Offensive Realism could either explain why he doesn’t see the first two mentioned aims as realistic, or give another Realist explanation for the cause of the war.
The anger-and-theory-informed potential thinking space
Those first-glance critiques are of course not to imply that Mearsheimer is not understanding/caring for his own theory, or is in fact following a pro-Russian-conspiracy-ideology without considering facts or morals.
But as a fascinated (and ‘normative and scientifically angry’ student), a critical but open application of Offensive Realism to Mearsheimer’s arguments and subsequent worldview seems promising. The anger/fascination is made productive, and has created multiple new thinking spaces.
First, the fascination inspiring me to write this essay was caused by Mearsheimer’s claim that the West/NATO/US is at fault for causing the war in Ukraine. This (‘normative angry’) fascination was made productive by trying to understand where Mearsheimer theoretically came from.
Therefore, this first fascination was transformed to the fascination for Offensive Realism as a theory that I do not agree with, but is frequently used to explain it. It was used to understand the theory and its arguments, and therefore the discourse about international politics better.
Finally, led on by the two previous fascinations, I got introduced to a new (‘scientific’) anger, that is not only directed towards the contents of the essays, but towards the assumed discrepancy of theory and practice. The created thinking space allows me to apply Offensive Realism to Mearsheimer’s essays, and – if this gut-feeling is substantial – critique him not only morally but scientifically, too. All those fascinations interact with each other and follow the same goal: to understand more and be less (destructively) angry.
Bibliography
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2022): The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War. In: Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. No. 21, Summer. Pp. 12-27.
Mearsheimer, John J. (2023): Great power rivalries: the case for realism. In: Le Monde Diplomatique. Available at: https://mondediplo.com/2023/08/02great-powers. [Accessed: 28.10.2024].
Mearsheimer, John J. (2024): Who Caused the Ukraine War? In: www.mearsheimer.com. Available at: https://mearsheimer.substack.com/p/who-caused-the-ukraine-war. [Accessed: 28.10.2024].
Additional references and notes
[1] As this article is published in a newspaper, there are no page numbers to cite from. All three paragraphs following are indirectly cited from Mearsheimer (2023), direct citation is still referenced.
[2] The problem with this angry fascination is, that I can never be absolutely sure, if I am angry because I normatively disagree, or if there is also something scientifically wrong. Therefore, I adopted this strategy, to test my anger(s).
